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CHAPTER 5
Mandatory Minimums and the War on Drugs
Daniel Wodak
Mandatory minimum sentencing provisions have long been a feature of the US 
justice system. In the Crimes Act of 1790, seven offenses, such as treason, car-
ried a mandatory death penalty:1 that is, upon convicting a defendant for trea-
son, the minimum sentence a judge could impose was death. From 1790 to 
1950, federal mandatory minimums grew slowly and “generally targeted crimes 
that were infrequent” and “decisively federal in nature”, like piracy.2 With the 
onset of the war on drugs, mandatory minimums became a more signi"cant 
feature of the justice system: “Congress passed harsh drug-related mandatory 
minimums in 1951 and 1956, repealed them in 1970 […], then passed them 
again in a biennial fashion, beginning in 1984”.3 Federal mandatory mini-
mums have grown explosively under the war on drugs,4 become more severe, 
and targeted crimes that were frequent and also punishable under state laws.
The effects of this trend are myriad. Most obviously, many prisoners are 
subject to drug-related mandatory minimums. In 2016, 22% of offenders in 
the federal system were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory  minimum 
and 67% of those offenders were convicted of drug traf"cking;5 of the remain-
der, many were also subject to mandatory minimums due to the war on drugs 
under "rearms and “career offender” provisions.6 It would be misleading to 
focus only on the federal system since “half of all federal prisoners are serving 
time for drug crimes”.7 State legislatures also passed and expanded mandatory 
minimums signi"cantly during the war on drugs and in some cases due to the 
in#uence of federal crime policy.8 Drug offenders were 6.5% of the state prison 
population in 1980; this rose to 22% in 1990 before dropping to 16% today.9
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Three developments have brought a renewed focus on these laws. First, 
many argue that drug-related mandatory minimums “warrant special attention 
because of their incredible force in driving mass incarceration”.10 This has 
prompted several bipartisan bills in Congress to repeal, or reduce the severity 
of, these laws.11
Second, US Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a memo on May 10, 2017 
instructing federal prosecutors to “charge and pursue the most serious, readily 
provable offense”. Sessions explicitly rescinded two memos issued by then US 
Attorney General Eric Holder (on August 12, 2013, and September 14, 2014, 
respectively), which had instructed federal prosecutors not to (a) specify drug 
quantities which trigger mandatory minimums except for “serious, high-level, 
or violent drug traf"ckers” or (b) use one drug-related mandatory minimum, 
§851, “in plea negotiations for the sole or predominant purpose of inducing a 
defendant to plead guilty”. This reversal of policy will increase the number of 
prisoners affected by federal drug-related mandatory minimums.
Third, the US is in the midst of an opioid epidemic. In 2016, drug over-
doses killed 60,000 Americans.12 In response, some have called for harsh new 
or enhanced opioid-related mandatory minimums.13 Florida Governor Rick 
Scott signed one such law, HB 477 on June 14, 2017.14
The US justice system is being pulled in different directions: some want to 
repeal drug-related mandatory minimums and curtail their use; others seek to 
expand such provisions and force prosecutors to apply them even more perva-
sively. How can philosophers help to resolve this debate?
One might think that the matter is best left to those criminologists who can 
determine whether drug-related mandatory minimums work. But disagreement 
persists in the face of such empirical evidence because mandatory minimums’ 
defenders and detractors appeal to competing principles of justice. In this chap-
ter, we consider three such appeals: to proportionality, consistency, and ef"ciency.
I will defend the view that the use of mandatory minimums in the war on 
drugs is unjust. A common theme will be that mandatory minimums transfer us 
from one type of justice system to another. Their use transfers the determination 
of sentences from a "ne-grained system (sentencing guidelines) to a coarse- grained 
system (mandatory minimums); that is why they generate disproportionate sen-
tencing. Their use also transfers discretion in sentencing from accountable judges 
to unaccountable prosecutors; that is why they generate inconsistency in sen-
tencing. And their threatened use transfers resources from police and courts to 
prisons; this does not generate ef"ciency but does compromise the justice sys-
tem’s ability to meet its aim of protecting the rights of the innocent.
PROPORTIONALITY
One prominent argument against drug-related mandatory minimums is that 
they generate disproportionate punishments and thereby violate the principle 
that the severity of punishments should not be disproportionate to the culpa-
bility of the offender and the seriousness of the offense.15 Why would manda-




It is helpful to here compare mandatory minimums to the US Sentencing 
Guidelines, which also emerged during the war on drugs. Senator Orrin Hatch 
(R-Utah) explains two important points of comparison:
Whereas the guidelines permit a degree of individualization in determining the 
appropriate sentence, mandatory minimums employ a relatively narrow approach 
under which the same sentence may be mandated for widely divergent cases. 
Whereas the guidelines provide for graduated increases in sentence severity for 
additional wrongdoing or for prior convictions, mandatory minimums often 
result in sharp variations in sentences based on what are often only minimal dif-
ferences in criminal conduct or prior record.16
Unlike the guidelines, mandatory minimums are insensitive to a long list of 
individualized mitigating factors: they guarantee that some low-level offenders 
will receive severe sentences. And unlike the guidelines, mandatory minimums 
involve “sentencing cliffs”: they guarantee major differences in sentences for 
minor differences between offenses.
Plenty of examples can illustrate these points. Like many individuals during 
the opioid epidemic, William Forrester became addicted to pain medication 
after six years of treatment for cancer. He used a fake prescription to obtain 
oxycodone and in 2009 was sentenced to a mandatory minimum 15-year prison 
term in Florida for “drug traf"cking”: this was required because he possessed 
15.6 grams of oxycodone. In sentencing Forrester, Judge McDonald noted that 
Florida’s mandatory minimums require him to treat “the addicted” and “orga-
nized crime” the same way: “we can’t carve exceptions that don’t exist”.17
In 2003, Terrance Lavar Davis pled guilty to felonious possession of 26 grams 
of cocaine in a school zone and delivery of 0.5 grams of cocaine in a school zone. 
He was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 22 years without parole 
because he sold cocaine at 11 pm inside his own apartment in a gated commu-
nity in Nashville, Tennessee, and his apartment was 900 feet from a school; if it 
were 101 feet further away, his sentence would have been 10 years shorter, and 
he would be eligible for parole after 4 years.18 Mandatory school zone enhance-
ments are a prime example of sentencing cliffs: minimal differences in the loca-
tion of crimes generate major differences in sentencing. They also result in 
signi"cant racial disparities because racial minorities are far more likely to live in 
dense cities, and in dense cities few areas are not within 1000 feet of a school.
Another example of sentencing cliffs comes from minor differences in drug 
quantities. Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, if one was convicted of 
possessing 5.1 grams of crack cocaine, one was subject to a mandatory mini-
mum sentence of "ve years, whereas if one was convicted of possessing 5 grams 
of crack cocaine, one would be subject to a maximum sentence of one year.19 
This law was infamous because one would be subject to the same "ve-year 
mandatory minimum for possessing 500 grams of powder cocaine; that 100:1 
ratio became a (less unjust) 18:1 ratio under The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 
but sentencing cliffs for minor differences in drug quantities remain a feature 
of the system.
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By transferring determination of sentencing from a "ne-grained system to a 
coarse-grained one, the use of mandatory minimums in the war on drugs effec-
tively guarantees that many offenders like Forrester and Davis will be dispro-
portionately punished. This is unjust. And this is not to mention certain 
dubious prosecutorial practices which trigger disproportionate sentencing 
cliffs, such as “mixture in#ation”,20 the use of conspiracy doctrines,21 and 
“count stacking”,22 which I will not discuss.
CONSISTENCY
Concerns about inconsistent sentencing outcomes were rife in the 1970s and 
1980s due to the discretion then afforded to judges; hence the titles of in#uen-
tial articles of that era, such as Judge Marvin E. Frankel’s (1972) “Lawlessness 
in Sentencing”. Studies found that judges’ responses to hypothetical cases, espe-
cially drug cases, evinced a “generally high rate of agreement on the verdict, but 
substantial variance in the choice of sentencing mode and the magnitude of 
penalty within some modes”.23 A central motivation for the creation of manda-
tory minimums in the war on drugs was to generate more consistent sentencing 
outcomes.24 This was true at federal and local levels. James Forman Jr. illustrates 
how concerns about racial discrepancies in sentencing outcomes led to the cre-
ation of harsh drug-related mandatory minimums in the District of Columbia, 
due to the efforts of prominent local black politicians like John Ray.25
The sentencing guidelines were also intended to address inconsistent sen-
tencing outcomes. But many contend that they are now inadequate for this 
purpose as the Supreme Court made the guidelines advisory, rather than 
 mandatory, in Booker in 2005.26 Many judges now impose sentences that are 
below the guidelines, especially for drug traf"cking.27 Since Booker, mandatory 
minimums are again defended on the ground that (a) offenders should receive 
similar sentences for similar crimes and (b) this requires drug-related manda-
tory minimums that eliminate discretion.28
A problem for this argument is that mandatory minimums do not eliminate 
discretion in sentencing. They transfer it to prosecutors. To understand this, it 
is helpful to mention Senator Hatch’s third point of comparison between sen-
tencing guidelines and mandatory minimums:
[W]hereas the guidelines incorporate a “real offense” approach to sentencing, 
mandatory minimums are basically a “charge-speci"c” approach wherein the sen-
tence is triggered only if the prosecutor chooses to charge the defendant with a 
certain offense.29
Because drug-related mandatory minimums apply to conduct that is cov-
ered by other charges, they give prosecutors a choice over what charge to apply. 
That “choice of charge can determine both the minimum and the maximum” 
sentence, so in exercising this discretion “prosecutors can restrict judges to 
narrow sentencing ranges”.30 As one commentator noted, “one premise of 
mandatory minimums is that the prosecutors are competent to decide appro-




Prosecutorial discretion in applying mandatory minimums in the war on 
drugs results in disparate sentencing outcomes.32 So much so that many previ-
ous federal Attorneys General have issued memos to restrict prosecutorial dis-
cretion because “federal prosecutors [were] pursuing their own idea of 
justice”.33 New Jersey implemented prosecutorial guidelines because “prosecu-
tors in urban counties had been offering much more generous deals that those 
in suburban or rural counties”.34 Racial disparities are also rife. For instance, 
prosecutors in Georgia “have unbridled discretion” to decide whether to bring 
a charge carrying a mandatory minimum life sentence for a second drug 
offense; when this practice was (unsuccessfully) challenged in 1995, prosecu-
tors “had invoked [this discretion] against only 1 percent of white defendants 
facing a second drug conviction but against 16 percent of black defendants”, 
so “98.4% of those serving life sentences under the provision were black”.35
The problem here is not simply that discretion has not been eliminated. It is 
that prosecutorial discretion is more worrisome than judicial discretion. First, 
the determination of sentencing is “a quintessential, historically recognized judi-
cial function”; the “effective transfer of that power to the executive branch” via 
mandatory minimums undermines the separation of powers.36 And second, 
prosecutors are less accountable than judges. The exercise of judicial discretion 
in sentencing is supported by judges’ written decisions, which are both reported 
and reviewable by superior courts. By contrast, “prosecutors have ended up with 
almost unfettered, unreviewable power to determine who gets sent to prison 
and for how long”.37 And the lack of reporting mechanisms leaves us with a 
paucity of data for informally monitoring the use of prosecutorial discretion.38
Defenders of drug-related mandatory minimums do not deny that they give 
prosecutors discretion. Indeed, they invoke prosecutorial discretion in defend-
ing such laws. The National Association of Assistant United States Attorneys, 
for instance, argues that mandatory minimums do not produce disproportion-
ate sentences because they are “almost never used, but instead only saved for 
the worst of the worst defendants”.39 If this is true, how would mandatory 
minimums ensure consistency?40
The available data also undermine this defense. Drug-related mandatory 
minimums are not “almost never used”. Close to 47% of federal drug offenders 
sentenced in 2016 were convicted of offenses carrying a mandatory minimum 
penalty.41 Nor are they “saved for the worst of the worst defendants”. Mandatory 
minimums are more frequently applied to less culpable offenders. In 2016, over 
one-third of federal offenders who were subject to a mandatory minimum pen-
alty at sentencing had a Category I Criminal History; another third fell into 
Category II or Category III.42 These are the least serious of the available six 
categories. As we will see in §III, there is a simple explanation for this pattern.
Notably, many reforms that restrict prosecutorial discretion—such as 
Sessions’ May 10, 2017, memo—force prosecutors to apply mandatory mini-
mums more frequently, resulting in more disproportionate sentences. This 
suggests that the con#ict between consistency- and proportionality-based prin-
ciples of justice is deep. So which principle should we accept?
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One option is to eliminate the con#ict between these principles by interpret-
ing proportionality as being determined by the law. If “offenders deserve what-
ever the penal code provides as their punishment”,43 mandatory minimums do 
not generate disproportionate sentences, and they should be applied consis-
tently so everyone gets what they deserve. This view is implausible: if whatever 
the law requires is what the offender deserves, a mandatory minimum death 
penalty for jaywalking could be proportionate. Moreover, this view is inconsis-
tent with the Supreme Court’s understanding of its narrow “proportionality 
analysis”: the Court has taken a “highly deferential” approach44 and hence 
upheld a mandatory minimum life sentence for possessing 672 grams of 
cocaine,45 but it still treats legislation only as evidence of what is proportionate.
Alternatively, one might deny the principle of proportionality. Simple utili-
tarian views take this route. And they thereby license the punishment of the 
innocent: as Adam Kolber writes, “punishing innocent people is just a special-
ized case of over-punishment in which a person with no blameworthiness is 
punished in excess of desert”.46 This is why simple utilitarian theories of pun-
ishment are widely rejected.47
This leaves a "nal option: rejecting consistency principles wherever they 
con#ict with the principle of proportionality.48 Consistency-based defenses of 
mandatory minimums require the equal treatment of those subject to the same 
criminal charge. That is an impoverished understanding of the principle of 
equality. Equality is better understood in terms of treatment as equals—treating 
persons with equal concern and respect.49 When Judge McDonald sentenced 
Forrester, he noted that Florida’s mandatory minimums require the equal 
treatment of (a) those blamelessly addicted to opioids due to over-prescription 
and (b) members of criminal syndicates. The equal treatment of (a) and (b) 
does not treat them as equals.
EFFICIENCY
While mandatory minimums are often explicitly justi"ed by appeals to consis-
tency, you would be in good company if you suspected that a different motiva-
tion was afoot. As the Sentencing Commission has noted, “the value of a 
mandatory minimum sentence lies not in its imposition, but in its value as a 
bargaining chip to be given away in a resource-saving plea from the defendant 
for a more leniently sanctioned charge”.50
This appeal to saving resources rests on a utilitarian principle of justice. And it 
is more plausible than other utilitarian justi"cations for drug-related mandatory 
minimums, such as those that appeal to deterrence.51 But such ef"ciency- based 
justi"cations are rarely made explicit; other justi"cations are often offered as a 
smokescreen.52 This is true in the war on drugs. Recall Sessions’ May 10, 2017, 
memo, which rescinded Eric Holder’s September 14, 2014, policy restricting 
prosecutors from using a drug-related mandatory minimum “in plea negotia-
tions for the sole or predominant purpose of inducing a defendant to plead 
guilty”. Sessions’ memo appealed to the importance of “enforc[ing] the law 




How would the use of drug-related mandatory minimums as threats pro-
mote ef"ciency? In two ways. First, “federal prosecutors often wield the threat 
of the mandatory minimum to persuade a defendant to plead guilty to a charge 
that doesn’t carry such a stiff sentence”.53 These plea bargains increase the 
ef"ciency of the justice system by avoiding lengthy, expensive trials. Close to 
95% of American criminal cases are now resolved by plea bargain. The criminal 
justice system would grind to a halt if these cases all went to trial.
Second, mandatory minimums provide defendants with strong incentives to 
cooperate with prosecutors in order to either plead to a lesser charge or receive 
a reduced sentence for “substantial assistance” under U.S.C. §3553(e). In 
2016, roughly 25% of offenders, and 30% of drug traf"cking offenders, who 
were convicted of offenses that carried a mandatory minimum penalty received 
a reduced penalty under §3553(e).54 This practice also generates inconsistent 
sentencing outcomes. But it is held to be vital to the war on drugs. As Jodi 
L. Avergun, then chief of staff at the Drug Enforcement Agency, argued in a 
2005 Congressional hearing:
In drug cases, where the ultimate goal is to rid society of the entire traf"cking 
network, mandatory minimum statutes are especially signi"cant. Unlike a bank 
robbery, for which a bank teller or ordinary citizen could be a critical witness, 
often in drug cases the critical witnesses are drug users and other drug traf"ckers. 
The offer of relief from a mandatory minimum sentence in exchange for truthful 
testimony allows the Government to move steadily and effectively up the chain of 
supply, using lesser distributors to prosecute the more serious dealers and their 
leaders and suppliers.55
Using mandatory minimums as threats to compel cooperation is seen as an 
ef"cient means toward this “ultimate end” of the war on drugs.
The importance of the pervasive use of mandatory minimums as a threat by 
prosecutors is hard to overstate. And yet it is also often ignored. Consider 
William Stuntz’s diagnosis of the cause of mass incarceration:
The rising number of inmates was chie#y due to the rise in the number of defen-
dants charged and convicted. […] Drugs were a signi"cant factor in the explod-
ing prison population, but they are not the explosion’s primary cause—and the 
same is true of the three-strikes laws and mandatory minimums that increased 
punishment for various classes of non-drug crime. More inmates live in state and 
federal penitentiaries than in the past chie#y because prosecutors have charged 
and convicted more criminal defendants than in the past.56
Stuntz may be right that the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences for 
drug and non-drug crime is not the “primary cause” of mass incarceration. But 
the threat of such charges is key to “the rise in the number of defendants 
charged and convicted”. Without this, prosecutors could not get evidence 
against and run trials of so many defendants.
This should make us question the degree to which mandatory minimums 
promote ef"ciency. If it is this easy for prosecutors to charge and convict so 
 MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND THE WAR ON DRUGS 
dwodak@vt.edu
58 
many people, the land of the free will continue to be, unenviably, the world 
leader in locking up its own citizens. There are many reasons to oppose mass 
incarceration, but the one that is most germane here is that it involves a remark-
ably inef"cient resource allocation. Federal correction costs increased 925% 
from 1982 to 200757 and now consume over a quarter of the Department of 
Justice’s budget. As prison budgets have increased, legislatures have cut fund-
ing for state and local law enforcement (by 76%, since 1998).58 Yet the return 
on investment for funding police is far better: “a dollar spent on police goes at 
least 20 percent further than a dollar spent on corrections”.59 So the use of 
mandatory minimums as threats does not save resources; it transfers them from 
police to prisons.
There are three further reasons to reject this appeal to ef"ciency. The "rst is 
that threatening severely disproportionate punishments in order to secure plea 
bargains coercively undermines the right to trial. This practice has been consid-
ered constitutional by the Supreme Court in Bordenkircher v. Hayes.60 But it is 
still odious for a defendant like Hayes to face the prospect of a mandatory mini-
mum sentence of life imprisonment without parole, rather than a "ve-year sen-
tence, for exercising the right to trial by jury.
A second concern with the use of mandatory minimums as threats is that 
this predictably results in the punishment of the innocent. Consider the posi-
tion of an innocent defendant who is offered a choice like Hayes’. Most defen-
dants rely on a public defender, who can often “spend only minutes with their 
clients before deciding whether to accept a plea deal”, during which time they 
cannot provide much advice, especially since “defendants have almost no con-
stitutional right to discovery during the plea process, [so] prosecutors are often 
able to convincingly bluff with weak hands”.61 (And many prosecutors do 
bluff.62) Many innocent defendants will plead guilty in the face of such threats: 
“[s]imply by charging someone with an offense carrying a mandatory sentence 
of ten to "fteen years or life, prosecutors are able to force people to plead 
guilty” to lesser offenses, including “many innocent drug defendants”.63 
Empirical evidence suggests that the majority of innocent defendants will still 
go to trial.64 Of those, many are convicted, and face severe mandatory mini-
mums. In 1999 in Tulia, Texas, 43 innocent defendants were arrested for sell-
ing cocaine; the "rst two who refused plea bargains were tried, convicted, and 
sentenced to 99 and 434 years of imprisonment, respectively.65 The threatened 
use of mandatory minimums thus results in the unjust punishment of the inno-
cent via compelling innocent defendants to plead guilty (to lesser offenses) and 
penalizing innocent defendants who use their right to trial but are wrongfully 
convicted (of more severe offenses). Defending the use of drug-related manda-
tory minimums requires a cavalier stance toward punishing the innocent.
A "nal problem with this appeal to ef"ciency concerns the usefulness of com-
pelled cooperation. In many cases, prosecutors do not use threats against “lesser 
distributors” to move up the chain of supply “to prosecute the more serious 
dealers and their leaders and suppliers”. If anything, they do the opposite: pros-




information to gain evidence against lesser distributors. Consider United States 
v. Brigham, where a driver received a 10-year mandatory minimum while a 
drug kingpin received a reduced sentence (84 months) for providing “substan-
tial assistance”. Judge Easterbrook, while af"rming this sentence on appeal, 
wrote that:
Mandatory minimum penalties, combined with a power to grant exemptions, 
create a prospect of inverted sentencing. The more serious the defendant’s crimes, 
the lower the sentence—because the greater his wrongs, the more information 
and assistance he has to offer to a prosecutor.66
Inverted sentencing not only involves disproportionate punishments, but 
undermines the claim that mandatory minimums are vital to the war on drugs. 
For prosecutors to give lower sentences to kingpins in order to fry the smaller 
"sh hardly helps rid society of drug traf"cking networks.67 It makes it harder to 
achieve that goal because the perception of unfair and overly punitive sentenc-
ing practices generates a “cooperation backlash”: it “leads victims and wit-
nesses of crime to think twice before cooperating with law enforcement”.68 
Victims and witnesses would provide more reliable evidence. “Who among 
us”, Alexander asks, “would not be tempted to lie if it was the only way to 
avoid a forty-year sentence for a minor drug crime?”69 A policy that trades 
sources of good information for sources of bad information is hard to justify on 
utilitarian grounds.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have explored three common arguments regarding the use of 
mandatory minimums in the war on drugs. Because mandatory minimums 
transfer the determination of sentences from "ne-grained sentencing guide-
lines to coarse-grained system mandatory minimums, they generate dispropor-
tionate punishments. And because mandatory minimums transfer discretion 
from accountable judges to unaccountable prosecutors, and transfer resources 
from police to prisons, they are dif"cult to justify on the grounds of consistency 
or ef"ciency. For these reasons, the use of mandatory minimums in the war on 
drugs is unjust.
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